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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the hypothesis that manufacturing industries in Japan that have been 
exposed to import competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) experience 
greater skill upgrading (increased demand for skilled workers). Using an industry panel 
dataset over the period 1980–2010, we exploit variations of worker skill categories by 
occupation, paired with detailed information and communication technology investment  
data in the employment share regression. We find that while the PRC’s comparative 
advantages in exports have shifted from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive products, 
this has not resulted in substituting skilled workers in Japanese manufacturing. Rather, it has 
had the profound positive effect of raising overall demand for skilled workers. Most of the 
competition effects were felt among production workers, leaving middle-skilled workers 
largely unaffected. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The well-documented historic rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a trading 
powerhouse has exerted competitive shocks on the world economy and raised serious 
concerns among policy circles in industrial economies. These concerns have been 
directed toward the PRC’s import competition as it pertains to the labor market, 
especially since it joined the WTO in 2001. The literature on this issue has grown to 
examine the various margins of labor market adjustments at the level of industries, 
firms, individual workers, and regional economies (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013; 
Autor, et. al. 2015; Ashournia, Munch and Nguyen 2014; Hummels, Munch and Xiang 
2014).1 The overall finding in the literature regards significant wage depression and 
labor relocation effects on lower-skilled workers whose tasks can easily be off-shored 
and substituted by the PRC’s imports. As a result, demand for skilled workers in 
importing countries has increased. 
In this context, this paper examines the relative contributions of PRC import 
competition on the observed skill demand shift based on a panel dataset of 
52 Japanese manufacturing industries for the period 1980–2009. Using rich information 
extracted from the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) database, we examine the  
PRC import competition industry variation and its effects on skill demand, while 
controlling for a proxy for skilled-biased technological changes (SBTC) and other 
confounding factors. The data coverage is long enough to track a shift in the  
PRC’s comparative advantages from more labor-intensive products toward more 
capital- and technology-intensive products (to be discussed fully in the next  
section). This has different implications for the labor market as the intensity of the 
competition effects is expected to shift from lower-skilled to higher-skilled workers in 
Japanese manufacturing. 
We use the occupation groups as an imperfect proxy for skill intensity. In this 
framework, we look at the two intertwining forces at play in skill demand: PRC import 
competition may exert stronger pressures on lower-skilled jobs via depressed wages 
that hurt employment prospects. At the same time, information communication 
technology (ICT) increasingly requires correspondingly skilled workers. Both factors 
increase demand for higher-skilled workers, but depress demand for lower-skilled 
workers, while leaving an ambiguous effect on middle-skilled workers. This is our 
working hypothesis which we will use for data in a regression analysis.  
The organization of this paper is as follows: The next section briefly describes PRC 
export performance with Japan’s changing labor market. Section 3 discusses the 
dataset, followed by the interpretation of the results in Section 4. The final section 
summarizes the key findings and derives the policy implications for a possible PRC 
economic growth slowdown.  
2. THE RISE OF THE PRC IN WORLD TRADE 
Figure 1-A depicts the rise of the PRC in world exports for the period 1990–2011. In 
1990, the PRC’s exports accounted for a tiny share (around 3%) of world exports. 
Since then, the PRC’s share has gradually increased. In particular, PRC exports grew 
rapidly starting around the early 2000s. In the second half of the 2000s, the PRC 
1  The shift in focus from the aggregate industry level has gone through the firm-level stage since the  
work of Bernard et al. (2006), followed by Mion and Zhu (2013), and Bloom et al. (2011). For a 
comprehensive review of the literature with this transition, see Hummels et al. (2014). 
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achieved a formidable export expansion, overtaking Germany as the world’s largest 
exporter and accounting for 10% of world exports. The PRC’s export share has grown 
without any disruptions, while those of Japan, the US, and Germany have not grown 
during the same period. At the same time, the PRC has become an important economy 
in the world import market (Figure 1-B). While the US still accounts for the bulk of world 
imports (around 15%–20%), its share has gradually declined since 2000. By contrast, 
the PRC’s share has been steadily increasing from the lower base accounting to close 
to 10% in 2011. 
Figure 1: The Rise of the PRC in World Trade, 1990–2011 
(%) 
A. Export (percentage share in world exports)  
 
B. Import (percentage share in world imports) 
 
Note: PRC = People’s Republic of China.  
Source: UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org/) 
The rise of the PRC in world trade has dramatically changed its specialization. Figure 2 
depicts the share of more capital- and technology-intensive electrical machinery and 
household appliances as compared to the more labor-intensive textiles and toys, 
showing a shift of comparative advantages from the latter to the former. In 1992, 
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textiles and toys accounted for around 45% of the PRC’s total exports. However, its 
share subsequently dropped to close to 20% in 2011. On the other hand, the export 
share of electrical machinery and household appliances doubled from less than 15% in 
1992 to 30% in 2011. This shift was largely driven by ICT.  
This finding has led others to argue that the PRC has been quickly climbing up the 
technological ladder. For example, based on the income-weighted export bundle of 
PRC goods, Rodrik (2006) contended that PRC capabilities are rapidly converging to 
lead the world technological frontier. However, total value trade statistics might  
be misleading; indeed, allowing for the role played by processing exports in the PRC 
trade structure undermines this conclusion. That is, it is well known that the PRC’s 
export specialization still largely rests on the labor-intensive assembly stage rather  
than specialization in technological content (Athukorala and Yamashita 2009). In 
essence, the PRC has grown to be an exporter of labor-intensive assembly goods,  
but still the bulk of technologically advanced parts and components embedded in 
export goods come from other high-wage countries (such as Taipei,China; Japan; the 
US; and Europe). In other words, the PRC’s comparative advantages still rest on  
the labor-intensive segment in high-tech products, even though these products are 
exported. These products tend to be mass-market commodities with relatively low unit 
costs (notebook computers, mobile phones), and possibly shorter product life cycles to 
avoid the risk of imitation. This explains why Schott (2008) observed that, while the unit 
price of PRC export bundles are relatively low as compared to those of Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies, they have, over time, 
started to resemble those of OECD economies.   
Figure 2: Structural Changes in PRC Export Product Compositions, 1990–2011 
(% in total exports) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org/) 
PRC Import Competition in Japan 
Table 1 sorts the top and bottom 10 industries by degree of PRC import competition in 
1980. In the textile industry, where PRC firms were considered to have comparative 
advantages, import competition was keenly felt: though less than 20% of Japanese 
textile imports came from the PRC in 1980, by 2009, the share had jumped to 80%. 
More strikingly, the competitive shift can be observed for the bottom 10 industries 
(mostly high-tech) that experienced an influx of PRC imports between 1980 and 2009. 
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Apart from motor vehicles, industries with negligible PRC import presence in 1980 
were, by 2009, subject to intensified competition. 
Table 1: Change in Import Competition by Source Countries/Groups  
in Japanese Manufacturing, 1980–2009 
  The PRC Asian NIEs SE Asia US 
JIP Industry 1980 2009 1980 2009 1980 2009 1980 2009 
 The Top 10 Sectors in 1980    
28 Miscellaneous chemical 
products 
3.85 13.24 2.56 9.04 1.63 12.39 55.18 26.60 
59 Miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries 
3.89 56.19 20.00 5.63 2.56 10.07 21.97 9.61 
33 Cement and its products 4.16 44.10 20.58 27.91 0.03 14.22 15.40 2.95 
24 Basic inorganic chemicals 5.74 30.94 5.43 8.06 1.43 5.11 22.50 18.35 
17 Furniture and fixtures 6.85 52.44 55.74 5.77 10.64 27.08 5.16 1.58 
34 Pottery 7.43 48.38 5.27 6.03 0.42 17.19 17.88 5.24 
25 Basic organic chemicals 7.94 2.40 15.73 92.28 0.00 0.00 46.67 0.04 
15 Textile products 17.65 80.09 39.01 2.31 2.49 7.43 5.44 1.24 
12 Prepared animal foods and 
organic fertilizers 
34.33 10.72 5.01 1.95 10.52 20.27 30.51 25.71 
31 Coal products 36.19 64.28 28.38 4.10 0.00 0.18 23.51 4.20 
 The Bottom 10 Sectors in 1980    
27 Chemical fibers 0.00 16.07 45.60 35.18 1.82 14.11 32.05 12.06 
48 Electronic data processing 
machines, 
0.00 63.26 1.70 13.08 0.01 10.61 71.59 5.82 
51 Semiconductor devices and 
integrated circuits 
0.00 10.85 20.00 50.61 12.26 11.48 55.34 19.19 
52 Electronic parts 0.00 42.39 53.71 26.55 0.05 16.60 32.56 8.60 
56 Other transportation equipment 0.00 8.86 1.40 2.46 0.57 0.52 60.58 72.40 
45 Office and service industry 
machines 
0.00 81.59 9.08 6.91 0.33 5.79 40.77 2.36 
50 Electronic equipment and 
electric instruments 
0.00 24.92 1.28 5.72 0.00 3.73 77.14 29.84 
42 General industry machinery 0.01 31.10 1.28 14.84 0.07 10.29 57.06 16.74 
55 Motor vehicle parts and 
accessories 
0.02 29.68 3.82 9.30 3.32 18.18 39.99 8.90 
44 Miscellaneous machinery 0.02 30.57 9.05 18.83 1.14 14.15 47.90 16.33 
54 Motor vehicles 0.02 2.72 0.02 3.96 0.01 2.84 23.82 8.40 
Source: JIP 2013 database. 
3. EMPIRICAL METHOD, DATA, AND VARIABLE 
CONSTRUCTION 
Empirical Method 
We follow the conventional estimation specification used in the SBTC literature 
(Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994; Machin and Van Reenen 1998; Feestra and 
Hanson 1999).2 The baseline specification can be written as follows: 
2  See Technical Appendix for the derivation of the cost-share equation, as commonly used in this 
literature.  
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1it i t it i itSh CHM Zα α β γ ε= + + + +  (1) 
where subscripts i and t denote industry and time, respectively. The dependent variable 
(Sh) is the employment share of workers according to occupation. In the literature, the 
dependent variables usually adopt the cost share for a relevant skill category (e.g., 
skilled worker wage bills divided by the total in a given industry). However, in the case 
of Japan, the employment indicator seems to be a more appropriate variable for 
analyzing skill upgrading.3  
We consider the following occupations: technical and professional managers (denoted 
as Tech) as skilled workers; office, sales and services workers as middle skilled; and 
assembly and manual labor workers (Production) as lower skilled. A vector of other 
variables, Z, includes value added (a proxy for the scale economies), ICT capital stock 
to value added, non-ICT capital stock to value added, R&D intensity, and import 
penetration from other economies (other than the PRC). Technically speaking, the 
inclusion of these additional controls may actually induce the “bad controls” problem as 
described in Angrist and Pischke (2009)—they themselves may be outcomes of the 
key explanatory variable and therefore bias its estimate. For this consideration, we use 
the two-year lags of these additional controls. 
The adoption of ICT in workplaces has facilitated a shift of production technologies in 
favor of skilled workers. Autor et al. (2013) emphasized that ICT substitutes for routine 
tasks, but complements non-routine cognitive tasks. Furthermore, many routine tasks 
requiring medium skill sets (or middle-level education), such as bank clerks and 
telephone operators, have found the demand for their services falling as a result of ICT 
investment in OECD economies (Michaels et al. 2014). At the other end of the 
occupational spectrum, jobs requiring non-routine manual tasks (janitors, taxi drivers, 
and aged care workers) might not be affected much by ICT because of the difficulty of 
automation in these tasks. In short, this strand of literature revealed that trade 
(especially imports from low-wage economies) and ICT investment together have 
contributed to the polarization of US and Europe labor market skill demand.  
The sign of value added, ceteris paribus, depends on whether the expansion of the 
industry output scale would require more skilled workers. If the estimate coefficients 
are zero, the hypothesis that the underlying production function is homothetic cannot 
be rejected. Otherwise, it implies that it is non-homothetic, suggesting the ratio of the 
optimal inputs demands depend on the level of outputs. 
Both the time-specific and industry-fixed effect are also incorporated in order to  
guard against omitted variables for explaining the employment share of skilled workers 
in the respective dimensions: the former is needed to control for any unmeasurable  
(or unobserved) time-invariant heterogeneity, such as industry-specific persistent 
technological differences or difference in the average management quality. Time-
specific effects are also introduced to control for a homogenous form of technological 
3  An alternative measure is the share of skilled workers in the total wage bills of all workers. However, this 
cannot be computed for the time period covered in this paper because of the unavailability of 
disaggregated industry-level wage data for nonproduction workers. Two data sources are generally 
available for compiling the wage bills of Japanese manufacturing nonproduction/production workers: the 
Census of Manufactures (CM) from the Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment, and the 
Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) from the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. The CM 
includes cash earnings of production and nonproduction workers at the detailed 4-digit level of Japan 
Statistical Industry Classification. However, since 1990, this information has become unavailable in the 
CM published data. The BSWS provides wage earnings data for nonproduction and production workers, 
but they are available only for the total manufacturing industry from 1985 onward. 
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change across industries, but varying across time as well as capturing other 
macroeconomics shocks.  
3.1 Data 
Variables used in the regression analysis are mainly sourced from the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry’s (RIETI) Japan Industrial Productivity  
(JIP 2013) online database.4 We use the annual data for the period 1980–2009.5 The 
time coverage is ideal since PRC import competition has accelerated in 2000s after its 
WTO admission in 2001 and the ICT revolution generally started to accelerate in the  
mid-1990s. The JIP dataset is organized in 3-digit industry levels (52 manufacturing 
industries) with several useful variables for our purpose, which we describe below.  
PRC Import Penetration 
We use the value of imports originating from the PRC (IMChina) as a share of total world 
imports (IMWorld) to measure the exposure to PRC import competition in a given  
JIP industry. 
Chinese imports
Imports
i
i
i
CHN =  (2) 
We also employ the conventional method of constructing PRC import penetration by 
normalizing PRC imports on domestic absorption (i.e., domestic absorption = value 
added + imports – exports).6  
Chinese imports
(Value Added + Imports Exports
i
i
i i i
CHN =
−
 (3) 
An Indirect Measure of Skills 
Proper skill intensity measurement must account for educational attainment, on-the-job 
training, and work experience (Hamermesh 1993). However, there is no single 
measure to capture these with available datasets. Additionally, the concept of workers’ 
skills is quite vague. This is especially so in the case of the Japanese labor market 
where strong company orientation makes employees less occupation-conscious  
as compared with their Western counterparts. Admittedly, either education level, or  
task-aggregated occupational data usually serves as a good proxy for worker skill level. 
4  The JIP 2013 database is the result of a collaboration between the Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (RIETI) as a part of its “Study on Industry-Level and Firm-Level Productivity in 
Japan”, and the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University as a part of its “21st-Century 
COE Program, Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)” project. The JIP 
2006 can be accessed at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/d05.html. The original version of the  
JIP database (JIP 2003) was compiled by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet  
Office, Government of Japan as part of its research project on “Japan’s Potential Growth” and the  
Hi-Stat project. 
5  The latest year available in the JIP database is 2011. However, import data partitioned by source 
countries at industry-level are only available to 2009. It should be also noted that annual trade data are 
only available after 1988.  
6  Value-added is defined as the difference between gross output and intermediate inputs. Gross output is 
the sum of industry shipment, revenues from repairing and fixing services, and revenues from 
performing subcontracting work. Intermediate inputs are the sum of raw materials, fuels, electricity, and 
subcontracting expenditure. 
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This study adopts the latter approach, using five group occupations. Following 
Guadalupe (2007), these occupational groups are divided into high, medium, and  
low skill level as follows: technical workers (systems engineers and computer 
programmers) and managerial personnel (Tech and Managers) as a skilled group; 
administrative, advertising and sales workers as medium-skilled group (Office, Sales, 
Services); and blue-collar (manual workers, assemblers and operational workers) as a 
less-skilled group. We have these skill groups in each of 52 manufacturing industries 
for the entire period.  
In practice, the occupational divide for workers closely tracks educational attainment. 
On the whole, the data reasonably support white-collar workers (those fall in medium 
and high skilled) having a higher education than production workers (blue-collar 
workers). For example, the employment share of university graduates among total  
non-production workers in Japanese manufacturing was around 50% in 2004, up  
from 39% in 1985. The employment share of high school graduates among total 
nonproduction workers has continued to decline from the mid-1980s, reaching 37%  
in 2004. The share of junior high school graduates accounted for only 3.4% of 
nonproduction workers, implying a high concentration in production workers.7 
ICT Capital 
We use ICT capital (real stock) divided by value added. ICT capital has been 
constructed using the perpetual inventory method based on real investment flows, 
using the quality adjusted price deflator available in JIP data. ICT capital is its stock 
multiplied by its user cost. 8 We also include non-ICT capital in regressions; taken 
together, they constitute industry-level capital stock. 
An Instrumental Variable 
A common problem in the reduced form of the empirical approach is endogeneity: 
higher skilled worker concentrations might actually result in more intermediate input 
PRC imports. For the same reason, the reverse causality is also a possibility: PRC 
imports may be correlated with industry-wide demand for skilled workers (to some 
degree, industry-specific fixed effects may address this concern, though not if the 
omitted factors also vary across time). This renders the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator as biased and inconsistent.  
 
7  Of course, occupational segregation is not an entirely satisfactory proxy of workers’ skill levels, for a 
number of reasons. First, there is the misclassification of jobs between nonproduction and production 
workers. For instance, according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations provided by 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), line supervisors and product development personnel are 
included among production workers, whereas delivery truck drivers and cafeteria workers are not. In 
relation to the misclassification of jobs into skilled/unskilled workers, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) 
considered the example of an experienced machine-tool technician with a university degree in computer 
science who programs the computers driving the tools, and a recent high-school dropout who files the 
reports and runs mail: if both work for a manufacturing firm, the nonproduction/production distinction will 
clarify the technician as unskilled and the office runner as skilled.  Another reason why occupational 
segregation is not a good proxy of workers’ skill levels is related to the specific context of Japanese 
employment practice. Under the seniority wage system, workers with a long period of service receive a 
high salary regardless of educational attainment and job type. As a consequence, it is possible to 
observe inexperienced workers with skilled jobs receiving lower wages, and experienced workers with 
less skilled jobs. These considerations make it difficult to retain the assumption of factor substitutability 
between skilled and less-skilled workers.   
8  See http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/JIP2015/index.html for a detailed discussion of the variable 
construction. 
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We adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach to minimize estimation bias. We 
further measure PRC labor productivity as an instrument for the endogenous import 
variables in the employment-share equation. This IV strategy extracts any exogenous 
variations affecting PRC export supply capacity, yet indirectly affects skill demand only 
through the intensified import competition in Japan. This instrument is inspired by those 
used in other studies: Autor et al. (2015) used eight advanced countries to construct 
the exposure to PRC import competition as pertained to the US. Their IV strategy is to 
extract exogenous supply-side productivity elements in PRC export performance. 
However, as pointed out in Autor et al. (2015), the instrument faces the validity 
challenge whereby industry skill demand changes among those advanced countries 
must be separate incidents. In our IV strategy, we directly use the labor productivity 
measure of PRC industries that have undoubtedly been behind the surge in export 
growth. These data are extracted from the China Industrial Productivity (CIP) database. 
There is no strict industry matching from CIP to JIP industries, so we arbitrarily 
assigned the corresponding CIP manufacturing industries to 52 JIP industries. 
3.2 Other Control Variables 
Other variables are sourced from the JIP 2013 database. Value-added is used to 
measure the industry output. The ratio of non-IT capital stock to value-added is used to 
measure capital intensity of production (denoted as K).9 R&D intensity is also included 
to control for the industry-specific time-varying technological capacity.  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.1 Main Results 
We start from running regressions on a simpler version of Eq. (1) with PRC import 
competition (CHN) as a single control variable (panel A, Table 2). To aid in interpreting 
the results, summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table 1A. In each 
regression, we have the following skill groups in the employment share regressions: 
Production workers, Office, Sales, Services, Technical, and Managers.  
The main finding is that PRC import competition has the statistically significant positive 
effect on change in industry skill upgrading, raising the skill demand of Technical 
workers: a 10% increase in CHN would lead to a 6.2 percentage point increase in the 
employment share of Tech workers (column 5).10 On the other hand, as expected, the 
higher intensity of PRC import competition would depress the employment share of 
Production workers (column 1). Middle-skilled occupations (Office, Sales, and Service) 
do not seem to be much affected by PRC import competition. 
  
9  Gross output is measured as the sum of industry shipment, revenues from repairing and fixing services, 
and revenues from performing subcontracting works. Intermediate inputs are defined as the sum of raw 
materials, fuels, electricity, and subcontracting expenditure. They are available in real terms in the JIP 
2006 database. Real value-added is defined as the difference between real gross output and real 
intermediate inputs. Capital stock refers to the nominal book value of tangible fixed assets including 
buildings, machinery tools, and transport equipment. 
10  In the experimental stage, we used two measures of CHN in Eq. (2) and (3), but they are essentially the 
same; as a result, we only report Eq. (2).  
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Table 2: Evidences of PRC Import Competition on Employment Share  
by Skill Category, 1980–2009 
Dependent variable (Sh) = Employment share by the skill category of workers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Prod Office Sales Services Tech Managers 
Panel A       
PRC import penetration –0.950** 0.150 0.171 0.014 0.622*** –0.022 
(1-year lag) (0.432) (0.158) (0.157) (0.011) (0.123) (0.078) 
_cons 70.912*** 15.937*** 4.476*** 0.037 4.717*** 2.887*** 
 (1.817) (0.617) (0.699) (0.050) (0.567) (0.368) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 
R-sq 0.162 0.442 0.203 0.613 0.275 0.819 
F 10.244 16.726 13.598 57.490 11.345 51.630 
Panel B       
PRC import penetration –0.757* 0.053 0.324* 0.021 0.282** 0.042 
(1-year lag) (0.434) (0.162) (0.180) (0.013) (0.126) (0.055) 
Real ICT capital over value 
added 
0.862 –0.475 0.094 –0.005 –0.281 –0.215 
(2-years lag) (1.092) (0.592) (0.379) (0.013) (0.679) (0.193) 
Real non-ICT capital over value 
added 
–0.001 0.001 0.000 –0.000 0.000 –0.000 
(2-years lag) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Real value added 0.714 –0.249 –0.665** –0.035 0.685 –0.486 
(2-years lag) (1.474) (0.610) (0.317) (0.021) (0.882) (0.326) 
Real R&D over value added 1.611 –0.609 –0.792** –0.015 –0.217 0.013 
(2-years lag) (1.138) (0.534) (0.305) (0.012) (0.609) (0.189) 
_cons 51.643** 23.348** 16.220*** 0.605* -2.752 10.627* 
 (22.854) (9.549) (5.288) (0.330) (14.734) (5.608) 
Industry-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-sq 0.187 0.469 0.256 0.518 0.275 0.839 
F 8.743 27.105 21.780 39.246 10.103 74.823 
Notes: All control variables are in natural logarithms. Weighted least-square (WLS), weights equal to the industries’ 
employment share in total manufacturing. JIP industry-clustered standard errors are given in brackets, with statistical 
significance (two-tailed test) denoted as: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.  
Source: JIP 2013 database. 
This result remains robust even after controlling for other confounding factors such as 
ICT (and non-ICT) investment capital stock, and R&D intensity and outputs (panel B, 
Table 2). All the estimated PRC import competition coefficients diminish once other 
control factors are included. The estimated coefficient on ICT capital intensity suggests 
that utilization is found to be statistically insignificant with an unexpected negative sign 
in the skilled employment share (columns 5 and 6, panel B of Table 2). This finding  
is markedly different from the commonly found robust complementary relationship 
between ICT capital utilization and skilled workers in US manufacturing (e.g., Berman, 
Bound and Griliches 1994). However, this is consistent with a previous study in 
Japanese manufacturing (e.g., Sakurai 2001). The result for the R&D intensity variable 
(a proxy for general SBTC) also suggests a negative, but statistically insignificant effect 
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on Technical workers (column 5). By and large, it indicates a dominant factor of PRC 
import competition raising skill demand.  
Table 3: Robustness Checks 
Dependent variable (Sh) = Employment share by worker skill category  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prod Office Sales Services Tech Managers 
Panel A       
PRC import penetration –0.960** 0.156 0.153 0.013 0.649*** –0.019 
(1-year lag) (0.449) (0.166) (0.156) (0.011) (0.138) (0.079) 
CHN export exposure –0.077 0.045 –0.127 –0.007 0.192 0.027 
(1-year lag) (0.388) (0.161) (0.142) (0.006) (0.227) (0.051) 
_cons 71.180*** 15.779*** 4.916*** 0.062 4.052*** 2.793*** 
 (2.486) (0.962) (0.822) (0.057) (1.099) (0.434) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 
R-sq 0.162 0.442 0.211 0.617 0.279 0.819 
F 12.571 24.484 6.721 65.386 13.340 41.338 
Panel B       
PRC import penetration –1.315** 0.206 0.440* 0.029* 0.604** 0.027 
(1-year lag) (0.647) (0.285) (0.228) (0.017) (0.240) (0.080) 
Import penetration: NIEs 0.495 –0.166 –0.076 –0.008 –0.117 –0.129 
(2-years lag) (0.602) (0.248) (0.127) (0.008) (0.257) (0.108) 
Import penetration: High 
income  
0.883 –0.382 –0.472** –0.018 –0.000 –0.043 
(2-years lag) (1.068) (0.414) (0.227) (0.017) (0.530) (0.112) 
_cons 39.157 26.645*** 17.370*** 0.762* 7.400 8.108* 
 (24.305) (9.530) (5.275) (0.436) (10.389) (4.231) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 
R-sq 0.139 0.426 0.252 0.523 0.187 0.850 
F 5.313 8.710 8.335 21.166 4.989 57.107 
Notes: All control variables are in natural logarithms. Weighted least-square (WLS), weights equal to the industries’ 
employment share in total manufacturing. JIP industry-clustered standard errors are given in brackets, with statistical 
significance (two-tailed test) denoted as: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.  
Source: JIP 2013 database. 
The well-known practice of Japanese companies is to undertake assembly activities by 
exporting parts and components to the PRC (offshoring), while retaining capital- and 
technology-intensive production (Head and Ries 2002). We therefore add an industry’s 
exports to the PRC as an additional control (panel A, Table 3).11 The export variable 
has no statistical significance and neither does it change the PRC import competition 
coefficient. It seems that the intensified PRC import competition can only trigger the 
offshoring of basic skill jobs, which can then lead to increased skill intensity at 
Japanese industries; there is no such evidence vis-à-vis exporting. 
11  This is constructed similarly to import competition in which we take the ratio of exports to the PRC 
against  industry’s overall exports.  
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In panel B of Table 3, we introduce industry import penetration from Asian NIEs 
(Singapore; Republic of Korea; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China), and other  
high-income economies (those in high wage countries in OECD). Inclusion of this 
additional import competition seems to magnify the estimated coefficient for PRC 
imports for some skill categories. For instance, a 10% increase in PRC import 
penetration now accounts for a 13 percentage point decrease in Production 
employment share (column 1).  
Table 4 presents results based on the IV method using the corresponding PRC labor 
productivity as an instrument for import competition. The broad result is consistent with 
the prior finding: PRC import competition raises demand for skilled occupations, while 
depressing that of production and manual workers. However, the reported estimated 
coefficients are much larger than the OLS results in Table 2. Further verification and an 
instrument validity test need to be implemented.  
Table 4: Instrumental Variable Estimates of PRC Import Competition  
on Skill Upgrading Effects in Japan, 1980–2009 
Dependent variable (Sh) = Employment share by the worker skill category 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A Prod Office Sales Services Tech Managers 
PRC import penetration –2.450*** 0.757*** 0.299*** 0.028*** 1.207*** 0.093** 
(1-year lag) (0.368) (0.148) (0.079) (0.007) (0.182) (0.038) 
_cons 76.593*** 11.826*** 5.912*** 0.286*** 0.532** 3.341*** 
 (0.637) (0.251) (0.275) (0.018) (0.224) (0.075) 
N 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
F 934.097 893.080 415.693 73.779 801.526 451.637 
Notes: All control variables are in natural logarithms. Weighted least-square (WLS), weights equal to the industries’ 
employment share in total manufacturing. JIP industry-clustered standard errors are given in brackets, with statistical 
significance (two-tailed test) denoted as: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.  
Source: JIP 2013 database.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper assesses empirically whether PRC import competition explains skill 
upgrading in a panel of 52 Japanese manufacturing industries for the period  
1980–2009. Our empirical results provide evidence of skill upgrading due to PRC 
import competition. In particular, PRC imports have the positive effects of changing the 
composition of skilled demand towards technical workers and depressing demand for 
production and manual workers. This result is remarkably robust for the inclusion of 
ICT capital investment (a proxy for SBTC), export intensity to the PRC, and import 
competition from other economies.  
The results shown in this paper indicate that PRC import competition works in favor of 
skilled workers by raising skill demand. This trend will continue due to an expansion  
in offshoring activities of Japanese firms. However, there is already an indication that 
the PRC is also moving up the technological ladder (rather than having specialized in 
the labor-intensive segment in highly technological goods). PRC import competition 
may then yield different pressures to skilled workers. It is less likely that such 
competition would substitute for skilled workers in Japan. Rather, workers and firms will 
be placed under much stronger pressure to innovate and further push into the world 
technological frontier.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Skill measures Prod 1,488 65.97 8.74 38.74 83.90 
 Office 1,488 16.20 4.00 6.85 33.33 
 Sales 1,488 5.12 2.52 1.35 15.02 
 Service 1,488 0.20 0.16 0.00 1.10 
 Tech 1,488 6.61 4.66 0.24 25.11 
 managers 1,488 4.19 1.42 1.04 8.42 
Controls PRC import penetration 1,146 1.78 1.93 –8.09 4.58 
 Real ICT capital over value added  1,392 2.48 1.23 –2.88 6.09 
 Real non-ICT capital over value added  1,392 236.84 355.13 0.59 5,648.12 
 Real value added 1,392 14.21 0.99 9.35 17.99 
 Real R&D over value added 1,363 3.55 1.45 0.21 8.02 
 Import penet. From Asian NIEs1 1,104 21.44 2.17 –5.76 25.61 
 Import penet. From high income2 1,104 23.05 1.76 13.57 25.53 
 Export to the PRC 1,148 1.61 1.36 –5.84 4.16 
Obs. = observations; std. dev. = standard deviation. 
Notes: 1. All control variables are in logarithm. Asian NIEs are Singapore; Republic of Korea; Hong Kong, China; and 
Taipei,China. 2. High income countries are those in OECD countries.  
Source: JIP 2013 database. 
A2. Derivation of Cost-Share Equation 
First, the cost minimization framework is described. Industry minimizes a quasi-fixed 
(short-run) cost function, ( , )C yw , in which output ( )y  and w  are a vector of 
production factors such as capital ( )k  as a fixed factor (as exogenous) and  
more-skilled and less-skilled labor as variable factors. The cost function takes a 
translog form, which is the second order Taylor series approximation linearly 
homogenous function with a concave in factor prices, as per Christensen et al. (1973). 
The translog short run cost function ( )C  with a subscript z denoting industry is then 
written as follows (a time subscription is dropped for convenience):  
0 , ,
1 1
, , , , , ,
1 1 1 1
, , ,
1 1
ln ln ln
1 ln ln ln ln
2
ln ln
M K
z i z i k z k
i k
M M K K
i j z i z j k l z k z l
i j k l
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i k z i z k
i k
c w x
w w x x
w x
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= =
= = = =
= =
= + +
 
+ + 
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+
∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑
 (A.1) 
where iw  refers to the optimally chosen variable factor prices with subscripts denoting 
, 1,i j M=   and kx  denotes either the quantities of fixed inputs (capital), outputs or 
other structural parameters with subscripts , 1, .k l K=   
  
14 
 
ADBI Working Paper 644 Yamashita 
 
Equation (A.1) requires the following linear parameter restrictions to satisfy the linearly 
homogenous property with respect to variable factor costs ( )iw :  
, , , ,
1
,  ,  1,
M
i j j i k l l k i
i
γ γ δ δ α
=
= = =∑  and , ,
1 1
0.
M M
i j i k
i i
γ ϕ
= =
= =∑ ∑  
Differentiating equation (A.1) with respect to ln iw  yields the cost share of variable 
factor i : 
ln
ln
iz
i z
wC C
w w C
 ∂ ∂ =   ∂ ∂  
 where C
w
∂ 
 ∂ 
 refers to factor demand for input i  by 
Shephard’s lemma. It follows that ,
ln
ln
i iz
z i
i z
E wC S
w C
∂
= =
∂
 is equal to the share of factor i  
in total costs, denoted by ,z iS  (where E is a factor i employment). In the end, it yields a 
cost share equation of variable factor of input i: 
, , , ,
1 1
ln ln
M K
z i i z j i k z k
j k
S w xα ϕ
= =
= + +∑ ∑  and ,
1
1.
M
z i
i
S
=
=∑  (A.2) 
Equation (A.2) relates the cost share of variable factor i to factor prices and the output 
level and fixed input capital. A cost share for variable factor j can be similarly derived. 
By assuming the coefficients of independent variables are equal across all industries, 
equation (A.2) can be pooled cross-industry and by time. 
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